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Competition Under the Civil Aeronautics
Actt
JAMES

L.

HIGHSAW, JR.,* Alm WILLIAm
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I. REGULATED COMPETIiON
The ideal of competition, as a regulator of economic enterprise, has long been a part of American political thought.' As our
economic organization has become more complex, this ideal has
undergone a continuous development in the direction of regulated competition. 2 The development has been the most pronounced in the field of public utilities.3 Within this area the
regulation of transportation has become increasingly a matter of
public concern. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887, 4 there has followed a long series of legislative enactments
designed to build up a national transportation system founded on
a basis of regulated competition. 5
One of the principal problems in the control of transportation
and the regulation of competition between transport enterprises

has been that of establishing a service pattern and limiting the
number of entrants within that pattern. The administrative
device created by7 legislation for this function has been that of the

"certificate of public convenience and necessity." This device

* Attorney, General Counsel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board.
* Attorney, General Counsel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board.
t The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and are not to be
taken as expressions of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
1. While this ideal has not always been met in actual practice, the existence of numerous enactments to enforce competition testify to its force.
2. The various transportation acts culminating in the Transportation
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 890 (1940), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 491-498 (Supp. 1944); the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79
(1941); the Fedeial Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 152 (Supp. 1944), all bear witness to legislative concern over concentrations
of economic power, and its control by regulation of competition.
3. In addition to the statutes cited under footnote 2 above there is the
state system of public utility acts.
4. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1929).
5. Interstate Commerce Act, amendments thereto, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.,
(Part II, Motor Carriers Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, as amended 54 Stat. 919
(1940], 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. [Supp. 1944); Part III, Water Carriers, 54
Stat. 929 [1940], 49 U.S.C . § 901 et seq. [Supp. 1944]). Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 401 (Supp. 1944).
[ 148]
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has been made a part of federal statutes regulating transportation from.the original Interstate Commerce Act down through the
Transportation Act of 1940.0 Under it, any person who wishes to
engage in a particular enterprise subject to such certificates, must
make application to an administrative body, and obtain an authorization to engage in the business, based on a finding that the
proposed service is in the "public convenience and necessity." The
meaning of the use of these certificates and their relationship
to the issue of competition has been clearly set forth by Justice
Brandeis in his dissent in New State Ice Company v.Liebmann:7
"The Oklahoma statute makes entry into the business of
manufacturing ice for sale and distribution dependent, in
effect, upon a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Such a certificate was unknown to the common law. It is a
creature of the machine age, in which plants have displaced
tools and businesses are substituted for trades. The purpose of
requiring it is to promote the public interest by preventing
waste.... The introduction in the United States of the cer-

tificate of public convenience and necessity marked the
growing conviction that under certain circumstances free
competition might be harmful to the community, and that,
when it was so, absolute freedom to enter the business of one's
choice should be denied ....
"Long before the enactment of the Oklahoma statute here
challenged, a like requirement had become common in the
United States in some lines of business. The certificate was
required first for railroads; then for street railways; then for
other public utilities whose operation is dependent upon the
grant of some special privilege. Latterly, the requirement has
been widely extended to common carriers by motor vehicle
which use the highways."
In the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,8 Congress extended the
application of this administrative device to the field of air transportation.
Under that act an authorization must be secured from the
Civil Aeronautics Board in order to engage in interstate, overseas,
6. 54 Stat. 899 (1940) 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1944).
7. 285 U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932).
8. 52 Stat. 977 (1938), as amended by the Act of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 735

(1940), 49 U.S.C.A. § 401 (Supp. 1944). (Hereinafter called "the Act").
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or foreign air transportation.9 The Board 10 shall authorize such
transportation only after a finding, supported by a record on
hearing, that the applicant is fit, willing and able, and that the
transportation (in the case of a domestic air carrier) is required
by the public convenience and necessity, 1 or (in the case of a
carrier) that the transportation will be in the public
foreign air
12
interest.
The Act sets up certain guides for the Board to follow in
determining whether proposed air transportation is in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
necessity. 18 Among elements which the Board must consider in
making such a determination is that of "competition to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense."" From this general statutory
requirement the Board, in the issuance of certificates to engage in
air .transportation, has developed concepts of competition in
such transportation that are here the subject of review.
Although issues relating to competition under the Civil Aeronautics Act have arisen primarily from proceedings involving
applications for new routes, other parts of the Act are concerned
9. Section 401 of the Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 481 [Supp. 19441), requires such
a certificate for any domestic air carrier. Section 402 of the Act (49 U.S.C.A.
§ 482 [Supp. 1944]) requires a permit issued by the Board for any foreign
air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, which is defined by Section 1 of the Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 401 [Supp. 1944]), to mean carriage by aircraft of-persons or property as a common carrier between a place in the
United States and any place outside thereof.
10. The original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created an agency known
as the Civil Aeronautics Authority, composed of five members, and containing an administrator. The power and duty of issuing certificates for
air transportation was conferred upon this agency. (49 U.S.C.A. § 481 [Supp.
1944]). Reorganization Plan No. III, submitted by the President to Congress
on April 2, 1940, pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 561
[1939], 5 U.S.C.A. § 138 [Supp. 19441), centralized in the administrator
those functions of the Civil Aeronautics Authority that are essentially of
an administrative character as distinguished from those relating to economic
regulation. Plan III left with the five-man Authority all functions relating
to economic regulation, which includes the issuance of certificates to engage
in air transportation. Reorganization Plan No. IV, transmitted by the President to Congress on April 11, 1940, changed the name of the five-member
Authority to the Civil Aeronautics Board, and provided that the Board report to Congress and the President through the Secretary of Commerce.
The term "Board" will be used throughout to cover both the powers of the
five-man Authority and the later Board.
11. Section 401 (d) (1), 49 U.S.C.A. § 481 (d) (1) (Supp. 1944). Provision
is made in Paragraph (2) for the issuance of temporary certificates. 49
U.S.C.A. § 481 (d) (2) (Supp. 1944).
12. Section 402(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 482 (Supp. 1944).
13. Section 2, 49 U.S.C.A. § 402 (Supp. 1944).
14. Section 2(d), 49 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (Supp. 1944).
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with these problems. The most important of these are the provisions of Section 408 which prevent various relationships in the
control of air carriers leading to the restraint of competition. 5
Some of the proceedings here reviewed have arisen in the adjudication of issues created by this section. 16

II.

REGULATED COMPETITION IN

TRANSPORTATION

Previous to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act by
Congress, there had been a considerable background of experience, both state and national, in the regulation of competition in
the field of transportation. This experience has provided concepts
and developed principles which could serve as guideposts in
15. 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 488 (Supp. 1944). Section 408 reads
In part as follows:
"(a) It shall be unlawful, unless approved by order of the Authority as
provided in this section"(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air carrier and any other
common carrier or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to
consolidate or merge their properties, or any part thereof, into one person
for the ownership, management, or operation of the properties theretofore
in separate ownerships;
"(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an air carrier, or any
other common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any
substantial part hereof, or any air carrier;
"(3) For any air carrier or person controlling an air
carrier to purchase,
lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any substantial part thereof,
of any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics otherwise than as an air

carrier;
"(4) For any foreign air carrier or person controlling a foreign air
carrier to acquire control, in any manner whatsoever, of any citizen of the
United States engaged in any phase of aeronautics;
"(5 For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other
common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics,
to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever;
"(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to acquire
control, in any manner, whatsoever, of any person engaged in any phase
of aeronautics otherwise than as an air carrier; or
"(7) For any person to continue to maintain any relationship established
in violation of any of the foregoing subdivisions of this subsection."
16. Mention should also be made here of Section 411 of the Act (49
U.S.C.A. § 491 [Supp. 1944]) which forbids air carriers or foreign air carriers
to engage in unfair methods of competition; Section 409 (49 U.S.C.A. § 489
[Supp. 1944]) which prohibits interlocking relationships except on approval
by the Board, and of Section 414 (49 U.S.C.A. § 494 FSupp. 1944]), which
relieves any person from the operation of the "anti-trust laws" with respect
to certain acts approved by the Board pursuant to the statute. Those relate
to control of air carriers, interlocking relationships, and to approval of
agreements between an air carrier and any other air carrier, foreign air
carrier QV other carrier involving enumerated subjects.
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formulating the place of competition in air transportation within
the statutory standards. 17
In the state regulation of transportation during the two
decades preceding the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act, there
was evidenced a trend away from competition. Typical of this
view were the declarations of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in Monongahela West Penn Public Service
8
The case
Company v. State Road Commission of West Virginia."
involved applications by two subsidiaries of railroads and by two
independent bus operators for certificates to operate motorbuses
over certain routes. The State Road Commission granted the
applications of the independent operators. The decision was
reversed by a lower court whose holding was affirmed by the
highest court of the state. The latter went largely on the ground
that an existing carrier was entitled to protection from unnecessary competition and was to be given an opportunity to provide
new services. The court spoke of the changing concepts of
competition in our economic life:19
"Then [i.e. 1837] 'competition is the life of trade' was
accepted as a guiding maxim of economics. That maxim has
long since been rejected in so far as it applies to public
utilities. Uncontrolled competition is now regarded as
destructive of such utilities. In 1837 the state vNatched with
17. The Board properly recognized that its determinations must be
largely ascertained with reference to the Civil Aeronautics Act. Thus, in
its first new route case the Board declared:
"The phrase 'public convenience and necessity' has long been used as
the statutory standard for the guidance of various administrative bodies in
connection with the regulation of public utilities. It has been universally
recognized that the phrase is susceptible of no exact definition and that its
meaning must be largely ascertained by reference to the context and objectives of the particular statute in which it is used." Northwest Airlines,
Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 1 C.A.A. Rep. 578, 576577 (1940).
However, a brief glimpse at the development of concepts of competition
In other transportation previous to the Civil Aeronautics Act gives a clearer
picture of the legal atmosphere in which that Act was to operate.'
18. 104 W. Va. 183, 139 S.E. 744 (1927). Also illustrative of this trend
are Re Fred Himburg and Re George Davy, P.U.R. 1927C, 420 (1922-Michigan, Public Utilities Commission); West Suburban Transportation Co. v.
Chicago & W.T. Ry., 309 Ill. 87, 140 N.E. 56 (1923). In the latter case, the
Illinois Supreme Court declared:
"It is not the policy of the Public Utilities Act to promote competition
between common carriers as a means of providing service to the public.
The policy established by that act is that, through regulation of an established carrier occupying a given field and protecting it from competition
it may be able to serve the public more efficiently and at a more reasonable
rate than would be the case if other competing lines were authorized to serve
'the public in the same territory. ..

."

19. 104 W.Va. 183, 139 S.E. 744 (1927).
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indifference one public utility stifle another. Now the state
controls its public utilities, and, as an incident to its regulatory
power, acknowledges a duty to protect them."
The same tendency manifest itself in state regulation of air
authority to conduct an air taxi and air carrier business, the
20
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission declared:
"The Commission recognizes that the policy of the nation
and state is to foster and encourage aviation. The facts in this
case, however, are in the opinion of the Commission convincing that in a community such as Gettysburg the creation of
unnecessary and destructive competition could not and would
not be a contributing factor in the development of commercial
flying service in Pennsylvania, but would be a decided
hindrance to its development. Common carrier transportation
by aircraft must .be developed for some time at least by and
through private enterprise which should not be required to
struggle for an existence in the competitive -field under
conditions as existing in this case."
However, the Commission did not foreclose the issue, but
indicated that future developments would determine the course of
regulation: 21
"If, however, in any similar proceeding it appears that
the application of the noncompetitive principle is not in the
interest of and would not foster and encourage aviation, the
principle will not control."
Similar results were reached by other state regulatory bodies
22
in dealing with the rising air transport industry.
These decisions by the states did not mean, however, that the
transportation service patterns were frozen, and that competition
20. Re Battlefield Airways, 17 Pa. Corp. Rep. 410, 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 54,
P.U.R. 1929A, 476, 477 (1928).
21. Ibid.
22. 83 A.L.R. 338 (Colorado Public Utilities Commission, 1930 U.S.Av. Rep253); Re Century Pacific Lines Ltd., P.U.R. 1932C, 388. In this latter case
the Arizona Corporation Commission refused to pass upon the need for competition, and held that the issue had been settled by legislative action In
requiring certificates of public convenience and necessity. In other cases
state commissions granted certificates for service. Applications of Century
Air Lines, American Airways, Inc., and National Air Transport, Inc. (Illinois
Commerce Commission), 1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 197; Re Francis A. Riordan
(Nevada Public Utilities Commission), P.U.R. 1928D 854. In the case of
Re U.S. Airways, Inc., 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 290, the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission took the position that, since the proposed operation was interstate, there was no question of public convenience and necessity involved.
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was eliminated. It was recognized that under a variety of circumstances new service was both justified and desirable. These
included cases where the existing service was inadequate and
rendered at high rates, 28 where rates were high or discriminatory, 2'
where lower rates were proposed for the new service2 5 (although
this ground is generally not regarded as sufficient justification
standing alone),2 and where the new service could obtain sufficient business without diverting volume from an existing operator. 27 The mere desire to serve is clearly not a basis for a cer28
tificate.

No extended examination of federal regulation of surface
transportation will be made here, as this is beyond the scope of
the present study, but it should be observed that one of the
major purposes of such regulation has been to control competition. Such has been true in the case of both the railroads 9 and
motor carriers. This purpose has been clearly expressed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission:8 0
...

we believe it to be true that within reasonable bounds

competition in transportation is in the public interest. Certainly, however, it cannot be said that the transportation
world is at present suffering from any scarcity of competition.
On the contrary, it is widely prevalent, and in many situations
it has gone beyond reasonable bounds and is both wasteful
and destructive in its results. One of the most important
present duties of public regulation, indeed, is to bring transportation competition under proper control."
However, the Commission has equally made clear that
Congress did not intend to eliminate competition in the motorbus
or railroad field, and that while competition should not be
23. Re T. R. Rex, P.U.R. 1920B, 675 (Cal. 1919).
24. Re Thorneville, 31 Cal. R.C.R. 598 (1928).
25. Re Oakland-San Jose Transportation Co., P.U.R. 1920A, 920 (Cal.
1919); IRe Hatchell, P.U.R. 1923D, 543 (1923). Contra: Re Pickwick Stages,
Inc., P.U.R. 1929D, 647 (1929).
26. Re Lampson, 32 Cal. R.C.R. 185 (1928); Illinois Commerce Commission v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., P.U.R. 1929A, 96 (1928).
27. Re Grady Harrison's Freight Service, P.R.R. 1931D, 241 (1931); Re
Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., No. 6996 (Mo. 1930); Re Oyster and Watson,
15 Ann. Rep. Ohio P.U.C. 92 (1927).
28. Re Highway Transp. Co., P.U.R. 1926D, 594 (1926).
29. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46
S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578 (1926).
30. Missouri Pacific Co. Extension-Natchez-New Orleans, 9 M.C.C. 712,
717, 718 (1938); Consolidated Motor Lines, Inc., Extension of Operations, 18
M.C.C. 35, 46 (1939).
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allowed to run riot, it is the best known spur to the improvement
of service.8 1
In line with the development of regulated competition
briefly reviewed, the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics
Act reveals that its primary purpose was protection of the air
transportation industry from. excessive competition. 'This was
clearly brought out by Representative 2Lea in his explanation of
the proposed legislation to the House: 8
"At the present time there is no control by the Federal
Government that can assure to one of these companies security
of route or any protection against cutthroat competition. Now,
when the airplane is about to engage successfully in passenger
and express business, the field is open to destructive cutthroat
competition unless we have legislation such as is proposed
here ......

"Part of the proposal here is that the regulatory body
created by the bill will have authority to issue certificates of
convenience and necessity to operators. This will give
assurance of security of route. The authority will also exercise
rate control, requiring that rates be reasonable and giving
power to protect against cutthroat competition. In my judgment, those two things are the fundamental and essential
needs of aviation at this time, security and stability in the
route and protection against cutthroat competition."3
With this background Congress wrote into law the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, which set forth as one of its declarations
of policy the concept of "competition to the extent necessary to
assure the sound development of an air-transportation system."'
The Board, in its decisions, which we shall now examine, has
given practical effect to the policy thus declared.
III.

COMPETITION AND THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

In its first new route proceeding, 35 the Board set forth the
general principles which would guide it in determining the
31. See Pan American Bus Lines Operation, 1 M.C.C. 190.
32. H.R. Rep. 9738, 83 Cong. Rec., May 7, 1938, at 6406-6407.
33. See also H.R. Rep. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 2, which expresses
the same points of view.
34. Section 2 of the Act quoted in full above. 49 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1944).
35. Under Section 401(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (49 U.S.C.A.
§ 481 [19441, existing air carriers continuously operating were entitled to
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"public convenience and necessity" in a particular case.36 It was

recognized that although "a fixed and rigid concept of the term"
could not be evolved, there were certain sources which indicated
the bounds of the problem. These were the declaration of policy
set forth in Section 2 of the Act,37 and the sections thereof relative
to the financial responsibility of the government resulting from
the issuance of certificates for new routes.3 8
As has already been noted, Section 2 directed the Board to
consider "competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air transportation system." This, said
the Board, constituted a clear departure from a "laissez faire"
concept of competition in the field of air transportation. In its
place was to come a firm control to avoid wasteful competitive
practices. This did not mean, however, that the existing pattern
of routes and carriers was to be frozen. It was to develop, but
under a guidance, which would avoid the errors that had occurred
in the growth of other modes of transportation:"9
"The declaration of policy of the Act thus sets out the
to apply to the facts
broad standards Which the Authority is.
of any given case in determining whether the 'public convenience and necessity' requires the issuance of a certificate
authorizing an air carrier to engage in air transportation over
a new route. Obviously in the light of these standards, it was
certificates of public convenience and n, cesslty for such operations. These
were the so-called "grandfather rights" similar to those found in the Motor
Carrier Act. Under this section, the Board received and passed on numerous
applications. This study is not concerned with such cases, which did not
involve the problems of competition here considered. The place of existing
carriers in the air service pattern was determined by Congress insofar as
their operations at the time of passage of the Act were concerned. We are
here considering the new route cases under Section 401 of the Act.
36. Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (Duluth-Twin Cities Operation)-Docket No. 131-1 Civil Aeronautics
Authority Rep. 573 (1940). This proceeding involved application of Northwest Airlines for a certificate to engage in scheduled air transportation (1)
between Milwaukee. Wisconsin, and Minneapolis, St. Paul, Minnesota, and
(2) between Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Marquette, Michigan.
37. For the purposes of this study we are primarily concerned with the
provisions of Section 2 (d), 49 U.S.C.A. § 402 (1944), relating to competition.
which has previously been quoted.
38. Section 406 (a) (49 U.S.C.A. § 485 (a) [1944]) of the Act and (b) provide for the determination of rates of compensation for the transportation
of mail by air carriers, and the taking into consideration of the "need" of
a carrier in establishing such rates. These are the so-called "subsidy" provisions of the statute and are of only incidental concern here.
Section 302 (a) (49 U.S.C.A. § 452 [1944]) of the Act provides for the
establishment and maintenance of civil airways and air navigation facilities
by the Civil Aeronautics Administrator.
39. 1 C.A.A. Rep. 577, 578. In the particular case the Board denied the
application except for a route between St. Paul-Minneapolis, Minnesota,
and Duluth, Minnesota-Superior, Wisconsin,
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not the congressional intent that the air transportation system
of the country should be 'frozen' to its present pattern. On
the other hand, it is equally apparent that Congress intended
the Authority to exercise a firm control over the expansion of
air transportation routes in order to prevent the scramble for
routes which might occur under a 'laissez faire' policy.
Congress, in defining the problem, clearly intended to avoid
the duplication of transportation facilities and services, the
wasteful competitive practices, such as the opening of
nonproductive routes, and other economic results which
characterized the development of other modes of transportation prior to the time of their governmental regulation."
In the United Air Lines-Western acquisition case,' 0 the Board
developed more fully its concept of the meaning of "a firm control
over the expansion of air transportation" in relation to competition, as expressed in the first Northwest route case." It was
here that the Board laid down the principle of a "reasonably
balanced system of air transportation."
This case did not involve a new route proceeding, but rather
an application to the Board by United Air Lines for approval of
the acquisition of control by United of Western Air Express
pursuant to Section 408 (b) of the Act."2 The question of
competition was squarely raised since the Board could not
approve the acquisition if it would "result in creating a monoply
or monopolies and thereby restrain competition."'48 The decision
on this issue, declared the Board, must be reached by an examination of the proposed merger in the light of the standards of
public interest set forth in Section 2 of the Act." These standards
are the same as those governing in the new route cases.
The Board found that the acquisition of control of Western
by United and the subsequent proposed merger or purchase of
assets would so increase the size of United and its control of
40. United Air Lines Transport Corporation-Acquisition of Western Air
Express Corporation-Docket No. 270-1 C.A.A. Rep. 739 (1940).
41. 1 C.A.A. Rep. 577 (1940).
42. As previously noted, Section 408 of the Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 488 [1944])
makes it unlawful, unless approved by the Board, for any air carrier to
acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever.
43. Section 408 (b) of the Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 488 (b) [1944]).
44. 1 C.A.A. Rep. 739, 745 (1940): "Thus, as we have noted, section 2 of
the Act provides, among other things ... criteria of public interest: . . . 'Any
merger or other form of acquisition, therefore, which, by stifling normal
competition or by encouraging destructive competition, would tend to retard or prevent the development of an air transportation system properly
adopted to the present and future needs of the nation must be deemed
inconsistent with the public interest. ... '
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traffic in the area west of the Rocky Mountains as to adversely
effect the existing competitive opportunites for western business. "5
It also found that, if the acquisition were approved, Western's
route, which was the only north-south route west of the Rockies
independent of the transcontinental air carriers would become a
part of United's system. Such a result was felt to be undesirable
at the existing stage in the development of a properly balanced
system of air transportation. 6 The Board thus determined that
the factors opposed to the public interest in the acquisition
outweighed the considerations urged in support and denied the
application. The decision was based on the concept of "balanced
competition" which would be destroyed if the acquisition were
approved. Such a concept was summed up in these words:' 7
"In reaching a judgment on the soundness of the present
proposal of the applicant, we recognize the fact that air
transportation in the United States, despite its remarkable
advance in the short period of its existence, is still in a stage
of rapid development and expansion, and that neither the
limits of that expansion nor the ultimate design of the national
air map can at this time be safely predicted. The regulatory
policy set forth in the Act indicates that Congress was fully
aware of this fact. Past experience in the air transport
industry, as in other industries affected with a national public
interest, presented abundant evidence of the harmful effects of
uneconomic duplication of services, unsound combinations,
and undue concentration of economic power. Reference to
both the legislative history and to the text of the Act
demonstrates the congressional intent to safeguard an industry
of vital importance to the commercial and defense interests of
the Nation against the evils of unrestrained competition on
the one hand, and the consequences of monopolistic control on
the other. In attaining this objective the Act seeks a state
of competition among air carriers to the extent required by the
sound development of the industry. The maintenance of such
a constructive competition, we believe, will be best served at
the present state of the industry's development by a reasonably balanced system of air transportation in every section
of the country."
45. Id. at 745.
46. Id. at 746, 747.
47. Id. at 749.
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The Board then went on to find that concentration of control
would be fatal to such a competitive system. 8
"It is the concentration of ownereship and control which
is fatal to the operation of a competitive economy. To allow
one air carrier to obtain control of air transpotation in the
West Coast area greatly in excess of that possessed by
competitors would, in our opinion, seriously endanger the
development of a properly balanced air transportation system
in this region; and the elimination of the only independent
north and south air carrier west of the Rocky Mountains
might be expected to retard the promotion of air travel in
this direction."
This decision furnished a general framework of a concept of
competition within which our air transportation system could
grow. It stressed two factors: (1) the gaining of an undue
advantage which would retard competition, (2) theelimination
of a competition as a brake on air travel. It definitely indicated
that the "public interest" 49 demanded competition. There
remained the practical application of the general principle of
"balanced competition" to particular situations, and it is to these
that we now turn our attention.
The first group of such cases involves issues of monopoly
and competition arising from attempts of one air carrier or other
carrier to control another air carrier.
In an opinion handed down the same day as the UnitedWestern acquisition decision, and involving the same two parties,
the Board further defined its views as to the meaning of a
"monopoly" prohibited under the Act. 50 The decision in the
acquisition case was founded on a broad consideration of "public
interest" factors. Now the Board specifically passed upon the
scope of the prohibition in Section 408 (b) of the Act against a
monopoly which would restrain competition or jeopardize another
air carrier.51 The case involved an application filed with the
48. Id. at 750.
49. The case was decided on the basis of the provision in Section 408(b)
of the Act requiring a finding that a proposed acquisition of control "will
not be consistent with the public interest" for disapproval.
50. United Air Lines Transport Corp. and Western Air Express Corp.Interchange of Equipment (Docket No. 215), 1 C.A.A. Rep. 723 (1940).
51. In order to approve a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating
contract, or acquisition of control under Section 408(b), the Board must not
only find it consistent with the public interest, but must find that a "monopoly" is not created, thereby restraining competition or jeopardizing another
air carrier not a party to the transaction.
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Board asking for approval of an agreement between United Air
Lines Transport Corporation and Western Air Express Corporation for the interchange of certain planes at Salt Lake City, Utah.
United operated Route No. 1 from New York to San Francisco.
At Salt Lake City, it connected with Western's Route No. 13
extended from that point to Los Angeles and San Diego. The
two lines had maintained connecting schedules which involved a
change of planes at Salt Lake City. The proposed agreement
provided for the interchange of sleeper planes so as to provide a
through service over the two routes. The Board approved the
agreement with a minor condition.12 The proposal was found to
be not adverse to, or inconsistent with, the public interest, and
would not result in creating a monopoly.
In the realm of public interest factors, the Board held that
the interchange would offer a kind of competition that was
contemplated by the Act. In speaking of the requirements of
Section 2 of the statute, the Board declared: 8
"If, in the ordinary case, competitors are to be prevented
from inaugurating improvements in service solely as a
protection to a particular air carrier, the development of an
adequate air transportation system in this country will be
retarded rather than assured. The improvement of a connecting service afforded by two air carriers would appear to be
just as desirable as improvements in service which can be
made by the carriers individually, and under the express
terms of section 2(b) of the Act, the coordination of air
transportation is to be encouraged."
Having determined the agreement to be consistent with the
transportation. In denying an application of an "air utility" for
public interest, the Board went on to find that, since no additional
control over air transportation was involved, the agreement
would not result in creating a monopoly.54 It was concluded that
the word "monopoly," as used in Section 408(b) of the Act,
means the control of a particular business or article of trade,
without regard to the results which may flow therefrom."" As
applied to air transportation, it has reference to a particular
degree of control of such transportation, or any phase thereof,
52. The condition required the insertion of a provision in the agreement
relating to a depreciation charge on planes leased under. the agreement.
53. 1 C.A.A_ Rep. 723, 731 (1940).
54. Id. at 737.
55. Id. at 783.
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in any territory or section of the country. " "It follows that the
restraint of competition is a factor, insofar as the application of
the provis 51* is concerned, only if it results from that degree of
control which the Authority decides constitutes a monopoly of air
transportation."58 Such a degree of control was missing in the
case at bar.
Subsequent cases have indicated that the competitive situation will be examined closely to determine whether the proposed
acquisition of control will result in a monopoly, which will
restrain competition. Thus, the Board found that such a monopoly
would not result from the acquisition of Marquette Airlines by
Transcontinental & Western Air where TWA would have
competition from at least one of its two transcontinental competitors at every point on the route, if the acquisition were
approved; 59 nor from the acquisition of Mirow Air Service by
Wien Alaska Airlines which, although it would make Wien
Airlines the largest operator in the Seward Peninsula area, would
leave several competitors handling a substantial volume of
business." On the other hand, the Board disapproved an agreement between Pan American, Matson Navigation Company and
Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, relating to a joint
operation of local air service between the United States and
56. Id. at 734.
57. The proviso in Section 408(b) (49 U.S.C.A. § 488 [1944]) directed
against monopolies which restrain competition or jeopardize another air
carrier.
58. 1 C.A.A. Rep. 723, 734 (1940).
59. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA (Docket No. 315), 2 C.A.A. Rep. 1
(1940). In this proceeding, the acquisition was disapproved because of the
excessive purchase price to be paid. A supplemental opinion on December
18, 1940, approved the acquisition pursuant to a supplemental agreement
reducing the purchase price. This opinion was conditioned on a deposit of
payments in escrow pending a determination of Marquette's "grandfather"
rights. The condition was terminated by decision of Oct. 17, 1941, settling
Marquette's rights. Marquette Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity-Acquisition by TWA (Docket No. 7-401 (E)-1), 3
C.A.B. Rep. 111 (1941).
60. Wein Alaska Airlines, Inc., Sigurd Wien & Mirow Air ServiceAcquisition of Mirow Service (Docket No. 552), 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941). But the
Board denied the proposed acquisition of Cordova Air Service by Alaska
Airlines because it "would further increase that carrier's [i.e., Alaska Airlines] overwhelming competitive advantage in the territory to such an extent as to make the acquisition inconsistent with the public interest by precluding the development of a proper competitive balance." Acquisition of
Cordova Air Service, Inc. by Alaska Airlines, Inc. (Docket No. 930) June
27, 1944.
See also Pan American Airways, Inc.-Acquisition of Pan-American
Airways-Africa, Ltd., 3 C.A.B. 32 (1941); Lockheed Aircraft Corp.-Acquisition of United Airports Co., 2 C.A.B. 328 (1940); Pan American, Inc,Merger, 2 C.A.B. 503 (1940) for other cases where acquisitions or combinations were held not to create monopolies restarining competition.
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Hawaii, and certain traffic and agency matters, on a finding that
the pooling of resources and interests by the three companies
would stifle competition in air transportation between the West
Coast and Hawaii. 6 '
One other unusual type of case has arisen under Section
408 (b) of the Act, which has an important bearing on the question
of competition. This case relates to attempts of other carriers to
enter into the field of air transportation.
The second proviso of Section 408 (b) provides that where
approval is sought for an acquisition of control of an air carrier
by another carrier, the Board must find that the transaction will
promote the public interest by enabling such other carrier to use
aircraft to public advantage in its operation and will not restrain
competition. The problem posed by this proviso came before the
Board as a result of the relationship between American Export
Airlines and American Export Lines, a steamship company. The
steamship company created the airlines in 1937, and owned
seventy per cent of its stock. In 1939, Export Airlines applied to
the Board for a certificate to engage in air transportation between
the United States and Europe. The proceeding also involved an
application of Export Airlines for approval under Section 408 of
the Act of its control by the steamship lines. Export Airlines was
granted a temporary certificate to engage in air transportation
across the Atlantic, as hereinafter discussed, but the application
for approval of control by the steamship company was dismissed
by the Board for want of jurisdiction.6 2 The Board construed the
provisions of Section 408 as applying only to the acquisition of
air carriers actually engaged in air transportation, and as not
therefore applying to subsidiaries created for the purpose of
initially developing an air transportation enterprise. 3 An appeal
from the decision of the Board was taken to the courts by Pan
American. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Second
Circuit) reversed the Board as to its view of jurisdiction under
Section 408, and remanded the question of the control of Export
Airlines by Export Steamship lines to the Board for a determi64
nation on the merits.
In the subsequent reopened proceedings the Board found that
the control of American Export Airlines by American Export
61. Pan American Airways, Inc.-Pan American-Matson-Inter-Island
Contract (Docket No. 544), 3 C.A.B. 551 (1942).
62. American Export Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity (Docket No. 238) 2 C.A.B. Rep. 16 (1940).
68. Id. at 46.
64. Pan American Airways Co. v. C.A.B., 121 F.(2d) 810 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
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Lines (the steamship company) would not promote the public
interest by enabling the latter to use aircraft to public advantage
in its operation.1 The Board determined that, although the principles which govern the Interstate Commerce Commission in its
determination of cases involving railroad control of motor carriers"8 should not be strictly applied under Section 408 (b), the
latter proviso was extremely restrictive:
"This proviso is extremely restrictive, and only those
limited air transport services which are auxiliary and supplementary to other transport operations, and which are therefore incidental thereto, can meet the conditions laid down
,,17
by that proviso ....
The operation of air services by Export Steamship Company
was found not to fit within this tight glove. Therefore, the Board
ordered a divestiture of control."' As a result of this decision, it
will be difficult for a steamship company or other type of carrier
to acquire control bf an air carrier. This fact appears also from
the decision o'f the Board denying to Export Airlines permission
to acquire substantially all of the outstanding stock of TACA,
a Panamanian corporation holding the stock of various airlines
operating through Central America.9
Of additional significance in the question of other forms of
transportation engaging in air operations is that part of the
Board opinion in the American Export control case 70 relating
to the effect of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals upon
applications of carriers engaged in other forms of transportation
for certificates of public convenience and necessity under Section
401. The Board has' held that, as a result of the construction
placed upon the Act by the courts, a carrier other than an air
carrier, applying for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 of the Act, must show that the provisions
of Section 408 (b) are met, i.e., it must show that the granting
65. American Export Airlines, Inc.-American Export Lines--ControlAmerican Export Airlines (Docket No. 319), 3 C.A.B. Rep. 631 (1942).
66. Under Section 213 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 313
[1944]) no common or contract carrier may consolidate or merge with
another carrier, or may acquire control of another carrier, without the
specific approval of the Commission. Where the controlling carrier is other
than a motor carrier, the same general test set up in the second proviso of
Section 408(b) (49 U.S.C.A. § 488 [1944]) of the Civil Aeronautics Act is
applicable.
67. 3 C-.B. Rep. 631, 636 (1940).
68. Id. at 638.
69. American Export Airlines, Inc.-Acquisitlon of TACA, S.A. (Docket
No. 491), 3 C.A.B. 216 (1941).
70. 3 C.A.B. Rep. 631 (1940).
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of the certificate will promote the public interest by enabling the
other carrier to use aircraft to advantage in its operation. Translated into the language of the Board decisions, such carrier must
show that the proposed air transport services are "auxiliary and
supplementary" to its other transport operations. This result
narrowly delimits the entrance of other forms of transportation
into the field of air operations. The reasoning of the Board on
this issue is fully set forth in the American Export control case.71
The Board, before the court decision, as pointed out above, had
construed the pertinent provisions of Section 408 (b) as applying
only to the acquisition of air carriers actually engaged in air
transportation. Under this view the Board would not regard as
inconsistent with the intent of Congress the entrance by other
types of carriers into the air transportation field by the establishment and development of new air transportation services."' The
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals necessitated a change in
this view, declared the Board."8
"However, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
remanding this matter to the Board for consideration on its
merits gives a broad and comprehensive interpretation to
the provisions of the section in question, which now makes
clear that it must have been the purpose of Congress to prohibit, unless the conditions of section 408, including its provisos, were met, the entry of carriers engaged in other forms
of transportation into the air transportation field through
wholly-owned subsidiaries irrespective of whether this was
accomplished through the acquisition of a corporation engaged
in an existing operation or of one about to inaugurate a new
air transport service.
"Uhder this construction of the statute no sound basis
appears for distinguishing between an undertaking of a carrier engaged in another form of transportation to engage in
air transportation through a subsidiary and its undertaking
to engage in the air transportation field directly. Of course,
the acquisition referred to in section 408 could apply only to
the case where the air transportation is conducted through
some business enterprise separate from the carrier engaged
in another form of transportation. However, as indicated
above, it seems clear that Congress must have intended the
71. Id. at 636, 637.
72. Ibid.
7& Ibid.
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same principles to apply to both situations because there is
no "sound basis for distinguishing between these situations so
far as the public interest is concerned.
"In determining whether the 'public convenience and
necessity' require the granting of an application for a certificate by a carrier from another field of transportation, the
Board must give substance to that term in accordance with
the policy laid down by the Act as a whole. Therefore, in
considering an application under section 401 filed by a carrier
other than an air carrier, we would not construe the public
convenience and necessity as requiring the issuance of a certificate to such carrier unless the evidence indicates that the
provisions of section 408(b) are met."
In application of the principle of "balanced competition" to
domestic new route proceedings the Board has been faced with
the question of the entrance of new carriers into the field of air
transportation. On this issue the Board has indicated that the
field is not closed, although the need for such carriers must be
clearly shown. In the All-American Aviation case, the Board
showed that it was not sympathetic to the view that existing
carriers had a right of precedence in the development of new
services:

74

"Such an assertion of a preemptive right ignores the fact
that applicant is a pioneer in a type of service which the established carriers have made no attempt to develop....
"Any such theory as advocated by the interveners, which
would result in reserving solely for existing air lines the
privilege of providing all additions to the present air-transportation system of the United States, is untenable. Our adoption of such a policy would certainly not be consistent with
a sound development of air transportation ....

In the Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham case 7
tho Board pointed out some of the difficulties in the way of a new
carrier entering into the field of regular air transportation. That
case involved in part applications by Pennsylvania-Central, an
established carrier, and Dixie Airlines, a newly organized company, for a route between Pittsburgh and Birmingham. The
T

74. All American Aviation, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity (Docket No. 363, 2 C.A.B. 133, 145, 146 (1940).
75. Ibid.

76. Delta Air Corp.-Certificate of Public Convenience
(Docket No. 162), 2 C.A.B. 447 (1941).

and Necessity
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route was awarded to Pennsylvania-Central largely on the
ground that it is undesirable to increase the number of instances
in which connections between two carriers would be necessary
by authorizing a new carrier, when the service could be provided as well as part of the system of an existing carrier. The
Board recognized the implications of this decision as to- the
certification of new carriers:7
"In reaching this conclusion we recognize the fact that
the considerations which lead us to this determination would
be equally applicable in any case in which an existing carrier
is competing with a company without operating experience
for a new route or service. The number of air carriers now
operating appears sufficient to insure against monopoly in respect to the average new route case, and we believe that the
present domestic air-transportation system can by proper
supervision be integrated and expanded in a manner that will
in general afford the competition necessary for the development of that system in the manner contemplated by the Act.
In the absence of particular circumstances presenting an
affirmative reason for a new carrierthere appears to be no
inherent desirability of increasingthe present number of carriers merely for the purpose of numerically enlarging the
industry....

"

The need for a new carrier may be shown to exist, however,
as is witnessed by the grant of a temporary certificate to Essair,
Incorporated, such a carrier, to operate an air transportation
service between Amarillo and Houston. 8 This was essentially
a "feeder" type of operation, as distinguished from a trunk line
service, and may indicate, along with the All-American case, that
the future of the newly organized carrier in the air competitive
picture lies in such new and specialized types of service.79
In the area of international operations, the opinions of the
Board have thus far shown a belief in the need for competition
between American flag carriers and a willingness to issue a certificate to a new carrier in order to supply such competition. This
77. Id. at 480.
78. Essair, Inc., Docket No. 206 (Nov. 5, 1943). This decision of the
Board was appealed to the courts by Braniff Airways. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case for a
hearing on the narrow issue going to the "fitness, willingness, and ability"
of Essair. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. C.A.B., No. 8722 (U.S.C.A., District of
Columbia, 1945).
79. The Board has before it numerous applications for "feeder" type
service by new carriers.
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was illustrated by the decision of the Board in granting a temporary certificate to American Export Airlines to operate over
the Atlantic. 0 The Board was clear in expressing a need for
competition. 1
"It is therefore apparent that the fundamental issue is
whether a second United States air carrier should be authorized to provide additional air transportation service over the
North Atlantic trade route or whether the opportunity of furnishing all such additional United States in transportation
service should be reserved exclusively to intervener

...

[i.e.

Pan American].
"We are unable to find that the continued maintenance
of an exclusive monopoly of trans-Atlantic American flag air
transportation is in the public interest ..
In its application of the principle of "balanced competition"
to the certification of new services, the decisions of the Board
demonstrate a belief in the need for direct competition in the
advancement of air transportation. It has established the view
that the operation of a new route should not be undertaken by
a carrier operating a competing service, as an intensive development of the new route is not likely to follow if one carrier serves
both routes.8 2 The question of the effect of diversion of a new
route upon an existing operator is given due weight, but is not
controlling in every case. Where the public advantage outweighs
the loss to the existing carrier, the competing service will be
certified. 8 This position was summed up in the case of Braniff
84
Airways, Memphis-Oklahoma City-El Paso Service:
80. American Export Airlines, Inc.-Trans-Atlantic Service (Docket No.
238), 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940).
81. Id. at 29, 34. The Board has on file about 100 applications by American citizens to operate international routes. The Board has divided the
world into four areas for purposes of hearing these applications. Such proceedings are in process. They "will require the determination of many important issues such as the question of whether there should be more than
one American flag carrier in the international field; if so, whether they
should operate as much as possible in different world areas or whether
there should be competition between American flag carriers; whether, if
there is to be more than one, there should be any prohibition against a
domestic carrier proposing to operate beyond the borders of the United
States; and many related questions of an economic and political nature."
82. Braniff Airways, Inc.-Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route (Docket
No. 1-401 (b)-1) 2 C.A.B. 353, 386 (1940).
83. National Airlines-Daytona Beach-Jacksonville Operation (Docket
No. 5-401 (b)-1), 1 C.A.A. Rep. 612 (1940); 2 C.A.B. 353, 386 (1940).
84. Docket No. 503 (Decided November 10, 1944), Supplemental Opinion
May 8, 1945.
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"It is to be expected that as the national air transportation system grows it will become less and less possible to
authorize new services without affecting in some degree the
services of other carriers. In the present case the competitive
disadvantage which would result to TWA from the addition
of Tulsa and Oklahoma City to American's trans-continental
route is not of such magnitude as to affect seriously its financial position or to impair its ability to render service to the
public, nor does it outweigh the public advantage which will
result from the transcontinental service by American at these
two points...

"85

One of the most serious problems as to competition arising
from the certification of new routes, is that of providing additional service over a route. The Board early laid down the rule
that there was to be no wastefully duplicating, competitive service over a route. In denying an application of Eastern for a route
between Miami and Tampa already served by National, the Board
86

declared:
"....

it is apparent that excessive competition may prove as

detrimental as an inadequate amount of competition. ..

."

A corollary of this doctrine was the concept that normally where
air transportation service is needed on a route already served,
the public interest requires that additional service be provided
by the existing carrier rather than by authorization of competing
service. The Board has not in terms recognized this doctrine
though decisions point in that direction,8 and its existence in the
public utility field was noted by the Board in the American Export Airlines, Incorporated (Trans-Atlantic Service) case. 8
"It is true that where territory is served by a utility which
(1) has pioneered in the field, (2) is rendering efficient service, (3) is fulfilling adequately the duty which, as a public
utility, it owes to the public and (4) the territory is so generally served that it may be said to have reached the point
of saturation as regards the particular service which the
85. Id. at 6.
86. 1 C.A.A. Rep. 612, 617 (1940).
87. Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity-Additional Service to Canada (Docket No. 327), 2 C.A.B. 627 (1941);
In Pan American Airways, Inc.-Los Angeles-Mexico City Operation (Docket
No. 318), 2 C.A.B. 807 (1941), the doctrine was offered, but was not passed
upon by the Board.
88. 2 C.A.B. 16, 34.
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utility furnishes, the trend today is to protect the utility
within such field ....
"
In this case the Board seems to indicate that where the available business is ample to support another operation, and there is
lacking any worthy competition for an existing operator, a new
carrier may be placed in the field.8 9 Yet, in the Additional Services to Canada case, the Board expresses the view that "the contention that there should be competing, duplicating services between two points merely to prevent one government regulated
The issue
carrier from dominating that field is unimpressive."
would appear to have been resolved in favor of additional service and competition where there is sufficient traffic to support it
by more recent cases of the Board."' This trend toward greater
competition was begun in the T.W.A. North-South California
case92 where the doctrine of the right of an existing carrier to
furnish new service was thrown completely over for the principle
of competition:98
"This case raises again the fundamental question of the
proper role which competition should play in the development of our air transportation system....
"In considering the extent to which competition is necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation
system . . . its justification does not depend upon the unwillingness of an existing carrier to render adequate service.
The carriers' failure in this regard may evidence a need for
competition, but its ability and willingness to furnish a sufficient volume of services does not, of itself, constitute a bar
to the authorization of a competitive service. Otherwise, no
competition would ever be authorized for there is no limit to
the extent to which an existing carrier could expand to meet
increased demand. Adequate service ... is but the minimum
standard fixed by the Act, but considerations of national policy require much more.
89. Id. at 34, 35.
90. Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity-Additional Service to Canada (Docket No. 327), 2 C.A.B. 627, 652
(1941).
91. On December 12, 1941, the Board announced that no further action
would be taken in proceedings involving applications for new certificates of
public convenience and necessity. An exception was made as to applications
involving special considerations of national interest. On August 29, 1942, the
Board resumed consideration of new route applications.
92. Docket No. 314, May 10, 1943; Supplemental Opinion (August 13,
1943).
93. Id. at 4-5 of supplemental opinion,
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"The Act thus implies the desirability of competition in
the air transportation industry when such competition will
be neither destructive nor uneconomical and the Board is directed to implement such competition as will fulfill the purposes of the Act."
The Board then went on to declare that "there would be a
strong, although not conclusive, presumption in favor of competition on any route which offered sufficient traffic to support competing services without unreasonable increase of total operating
cost." The same principles were enunciated in two later cases
of the Board instituting additional service between New YorkMiami and New York-Boston.9 '
CONCLUSION

This brief review of concepts of competition in air transportation developed by the Board in its administration of the Civil
Aeronautics Act shows that the Board has a firm belief in the
function of competition to develop an air system in the public
interest.9 5 The Act was designed to prevent cutthroat competition in the air, which has proved disastrous in surface transportation. The Board decisions have carried out that purpose. At
the same time, it has made clear that the public interest will best
be served by the spur of competition, and its decisions have been
directed toward providing such competition. Its views may best
be summed up in the Board's own language. "It is of the greatest
importance . . .to maintain a properly balanced system of air

transportation in every section of the country in order to encourage constructive competition.""
It is worth nothing that the Board has been swinging towards
more competition in air transport. In the early cases the language
and the decisions of the Board tended to preclude additional competition. Recently the Board has indicated a willingness to permit
more competition within the industry. This early attitude restrict94. Colonial Airlines, Inc.-Atlantic Seaboard Operation (Docket No. 445,
Serial 2699), Feb. 19, 1944. Northeast Airlines, Inc.-Additional Service to
Boston (Docket No. 13-401-B-1, Serial 2903), June 12, 1944.
95. As the Board declared in the Export-Trans-Atlantic Service Case,
2 C.A.B. 16, 32: "Competition invites comparisons as to equipment, costs,
personnel, methods of operation, solicitation of traffic, and the like, all of
which tend to assure the development of an air-transportation system properly adopted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense."
96. Braniff Airways, Inc.-Certificate Qf Public Convenience and Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 353, 386 (1940).
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ing competition is understandable when it is remembered that in
the period from 1938 to 1941, airlines were substantially subsidized
through air mail payments. It was naturally felt that to permit
additional competition and additional carriers might weaken the
existing airlines, and throw a heavier burden of subsidy on the
government. Services and facilities were certainly ample 'to meet
the requirements of air transportation at that time. In the period
from 1941 to 1943, there was an understandable hesitancy to grant
new routes to carriers in competition with existing service because planes were not available to service new competitive routes.
Moreover, the extent of post war competition could be better
determined in the later stages of the war than the early stages. Of
course, in the case of international routes, competition from foreign air carriers has forced an earlier decision in the assignment
97
of new routes.
The Board's language in recent cases has indicated a desire
for substantial competition in air transport. It must be pointed
out, however, that its decisions have been more conservative than
its language. In the period from 1938 to 1943, not only were no
new carriers authorized to enter the domestic air transport field,
but in only nineteen cases involving seventeen thousand route
miles 8 did the Board permit service over new routes by an existing carrier. During the year ending June 30, 1944, moreover, only
one additional carrier, Essair, Inc., was admitted to the domestic
field, and that carrier was admitted on the rationale that it was
performing a feeder service.99 In addition in eight cases involving
approximately 3,500 route miles, the routes of existing airlines
were developed to afford competition with other airlines. 00 In
view of the potential of air transport in the post war period, the
development of competitive routes in these decisions is extremely
conservative.
It is felt, however, that the language of the Board indicates a
willingness to permit a far greater competition among carriers in
the future. This attitude has been most noticeable in the recent
cases. It is believed that the conservative action of the Board to
date has not been occasioned by any lack of understanding of the
97. Board tentative pattern of international routes issued on June 14,
1944. Hearings are in progress on applications filed on the basis of this pattern.
98. See Board Annual Reports for 1939 (p. 19), 1940 (p. 4), 1941 (p. 13),
1942 (p. 22), 1943 (p. 28).
99. The certificate of Essair, Inc., was affirmed by the Board on April 27,
1945, after a remand by the circuit court. It was originally granted on November 5, 1943.
100. Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board-1944.
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value of competition in developing a sound air transport system.
This hesitancy has been based upon the desire to develop the air
transport system slowly rather than permitting a haphazard expansion. It is felt that the Board believed that since the routes
were primarily for use in the post war period, decisions affecting
these r6utes should be made as near to the post war period as possible. Under war time conditions with the lack of equipment to
deal with the routes it was virtually impossible to develop an
intelligent competitive route plan. There was no compelling necessity to decide domestic route cases, as in most cases there was no
operating equipment. There is a strong indication in the opinions
of the Board that, when the post war factors affecting air transportation become clearer, it will lean toward far more competition
in the air transport industry than it has in the past. The conviction of the Board of the desirability of competition is well established.1 1 This conviction will take shape in the form of substantial
competition on domestic routes as soon as the pattern for post war
air transport is more clearly discernable. Moreover, in view of the
Board's decision in the American Export case, it is believed that
not only will existing carriers be brought in competition with
air
each other by an extension of their routes, but that additional
12
carriers will and should be permitted to enter the field.
101. T.W.A., Detroit-Memphis Service (Docket 303) August 3, 1944; Northwest Airlines, Inc., Chicago-Milwaukee-New York Service (Docket No. 629),
December 16, 1944; Western Air Lines, Inc., Denver-Los Angeles Service
(Docket No. 519) November 14, 1944; Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., Kansas
City-Tulsa-New Orleans Service (Docket No. 651), January 15, 1945.
102. While the opinion of the Board in the Essair case, supra, is cautious,
it is nevertheless an opening wedge that indicates new airlines might well be
permitted new routes in future cases.

